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Abstract: We focus on axiomatizations of the Pareto equilibrium concept in multicriteria
games based on consistency. Axiomatizations of the Nash equilibrium concept by Peleg and Tijs
(1996) and Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) have immediate generalizations. The axiomatization
of Norde et al. (1996) cannot be generalized without the use of an additional axiom.
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1 Introduction
In a recent manifesto Bouyssou et al. (1993) observe that within multicriteria decision making
‘[a] systematic axiomatic analysis of decision procedures and algorithms is yet to be carried out’.
In this paper, several axiomatizations of the Pareto equilibrium concept for multicriteria games
are provided.
In multicriteria games, a player can have more than one criterion function. Shapley (1959)
introduced (Pareto) equilibrium points for this type of games that are a straightforward gener-
alization of the Nash equilibrium concept for unicriterion games.
Axiomatic properties of the Nash equilibrium concept based on the notion of consistency
have been studied in several articles, including Peleg and Tijs (1996), Peleg, Potters, and Tijs
(1996), and Norde et al. (1996). Several of these axiomatizations carry over to multicriteria
games. However, we prove that the strong result of Norde et al. (1996), characterizing the Nash
equilibrium concept on the set of mixed extensions of finite strategic form games by nonempti-
ness, the selection of all utility maximizing strategies in one person games, and consistency in the
sense that equilibrium strategies in a game must remain equilibrium strategies if players know
that others will play their equilibrium strategies, does not have such an analogon in multicriteria
games. In this note we show that nonemptiness, consistency and an immediate extension of one
person rationality are not sufficient to axiomatize the Pareto equilibrium concept. An additional
property is provided to establish an axiomatization.
2 Preliminaries
A finite multicriteria game is a tuple G = 〈NG, (Xi)i∈NG, (ui)i∈NG〉, where N
G ⊂ IN is a finite
set of players, Xi is the finite set of pure strategies of player i ∈ N
G, and for each player
i ∈ NG, the function ui :
∏
i∈NGXi → IR
r(i) maps each strategy combination to a point in
r(i)-dimensional Euclidean space. The interpretation of this last function is that player i ∈ NG
considers not just one, but r(i) ∈ IN different criteria. For notational convenience, the set of
finite multicriteria games is denoted Γfinite.
The payoff functions are extended to mixed strategies in the obvious way. The set of mixed
extensions of finite multicriteria games is denoted by Γ. This set contains the set Γstrategic of
mixed extensions of finite games in strategic form, since these are simply multicriteria games in
which each player has only one criterion.
For notational convenience, let ∆(X) denote the set of probability measures on a finite set




i=1 µi = 1} is the unit simplex in IR
m.
Let G = 〈NG, (Xi)i∈NG, (ui)i∈NG〉 ∈ Γ be a multicriteria game, let x ∈
∏
i∈NG ∆(Xi) be
a strategy profile in G, and let S ⊂ NG be a proper subcoalition of the player set NG, i.e.,
S 6= ∅, NG. The reduced game GS,x of G with respect to S and x is the multicriteria game in
which
• the player set is S;
• each player i ∈ S has the same set Xi of pure strategies as in G;
• the payoff functions (u′i)i∈S are defined by u
′




A solution concept on Γ is a function φ which assigns to each element G ∈ Γ a subset
φ(G) ⊆
∏
i∈NG ∆(Xi) of strategy combinations. Analogously one defines a solution concept on
Γstrategic or Γfinite.
For strategic form games, we recall the following axioms. A solution concept φ on Γstrategic
satisfies:
• Nonemptiness (NEM), if φ(G) 6= ∅ for all G ∈ Γstrategic;
• One Person Rationality (OPR), if for each G ∈ Γstrategic with |N
G| = 1 we have that
φ(G) = {x ∈ ∆(Xi)|ui(x) ≥ ui(y) ∀y ∈ ∆(Xi)}, the set of utility maximizing strategies;
• Consistency (CONS), if for each game G ∈ Γstrategic, each proper subcoalition S ⊂ N
G,
and each element x ∈ φ(G), we have that xS ∈ φ(GS,x).
Norde et al. (1996) prove:
Proposition 2.1 A solution concept φ on Γstrategic satisfies NEM, OPR, and CONS if and only
if φ = NE, the Nash equilibrium concept.
Shapley (1959) introduces equilibrium points for multicriteria games. Let G ∈ Γ be a multicri-
teria game. A Pareto equilibrium is a strategy combination x ∈
∏
i∈NG ∆(Xi) such that for each
i ∈ NG, there does not exist a x̃i ∈ ∆(Xi) such that:
ui(x̃i, x−i) > ui(xi, x−i),
where for two vectors a, b ∈ IRm, we write a > b if ai > bi for all i = 1, . . . , m. The solution
concept on Γ assigning to each G ∈ Γ the set of Pareto equilibria is denoted by PE. The Pareto
equilibrium concept PE ON Γfinite is, of course, defined in a similar way by restricting attention
to pure, rather than mixed, strategies.
Consider a multicriteria game G ∈ Γ in which player i has r(i) ∈ IN criteria. For each
i ∈ NG, let λi ∈ ∆r(i) be a vector of weights for the criteria, λ := (λi)i∈NG. The λ-weighted
game Gλ is the strategic form game with player set N
G, mixed strategy spaces (∆(Xi))i∈NG, and
payoff functions (vi)i∈NG defined for all i ∈ N
G and x ∈
∏
i∈NG ∆(Xi) by vi(x) = 〈λi, ui(x)〉 =∑r(i)
k=1 λikuik(x). Shapley (1959) proves that all Pareto equilibria can be found by a suitable
weighing of the criteria of the players:
Lemma 2.2 For each G ∈ Γ: x ∈ PE(G) if and only if there exists for each i ∈ NG a vector
of weights λi ∈ ∆r(i) such that x ∈ NE(Gλ).
As a corollary, Pareto equilibria always exist in mixed extensions of finite multicriteria games,
since for any vector of weights the game Gλ has Nash equilibria in mixed strategies.
3 Finite Multicriteria Games
Peleg and Tijs (1996) and Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) provide several axiomatizations of
the Nash equilibrium concept for finite strategic form games. In this section two of these
axiomatizations are extended in a straightforward manner to finite multicriteria games.
We use the following axioms. A solution concept φ on Γfinite satisfies:
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• Restricted Nonemptiness (r-NEM), if for every G ∈ Γfinite with PE(G) 6= ∅ we have
φ(G) 6= ∅;
• One Person Efficiency (OPE), if for each G ∈ Γfinite with |NG| = 1 we have that
φ(G) = {x ∈ Xi| 6 ∃y ∈ Xi : ui(y) > ui(x)}, the set of strategies that yield a maximal
payoff w.r.t. > on IRr(i);
• Consistency (CONS), if for each G ∈ Γfinite, each proper subcoalition S ⊂ NG, and
each element x ∈ φ(G), we have that xS ∈ φ(GS,x);
• Converse Consistency (COCONS), if for each G ∈ Γfinite with at least two players,
we have that φ̃(G) ⊆ φ(G), where




NG \ {∅, NG} : xS ∈ φ(G
S,x)}.
According to restricted nonemptiness, the solution concept provides a nonempty set of strategies
whenever Pareto equilibria exist. One person efficiency claims that in games with only one
person, the solution concept picks out all strategies which yield a maximal payoff with respect
to the > order of IRr(i). Consistency means that a solution x of a game is also a solution of
each reduced game in which the players that leave the game play according to the strategies in
x. Converse consistency prescribes that a strategy combination which gives rise to a solution in
every reduced game is also a solution of the original game.
Notice that consistency can be defined by the opposite inclusion as in converse consistency,
namely φ(G) ⊆ φ̃(G) for every G ∈ Γfinite.
Our first result indicates that the axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept on finite
strategic games of Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996, Thm. 3) in terms of restricted nonemptiness,
one person rationality and consistency can be generalized to multicriteria games.
Theorem 3.1 A solution concept φ on Γfinite satisfies r-NEM, OPE, and CONS if and only if
φ = PE.
Proof. It is clear that PE satisfies the axioms. Let φ be a solution concept on Γfinite satisfying
r-NEM, OPE, and CONS. Let G = 〈NG, (Xi)i∈NG, (ui)i∈NG〉 ∈ Γfinite. We first show that
φ(G) ⊆ PE(G). If φ(G) = ∅, we are done. So let x ∈ φ(G). Then xi ∈ φ(G
i,x) by CONS, so
xi ∈ {yi ∈ Xi| 6 ∃zi ∈ Xi : ui(zi, x−i) > ui(yi, x−i)} by OPE. Hence x is a Pareto equilibrium:
x ∈ PE(G). To prove the converse, i.e., that PE(G) ⊆ φ(G), consider x̂ ∈ PE(G). Construct
a finite multicriteria game H as follows:
• the player set is NG ∪ {0};
• players i ∈ NG have the same strategy set Xi as in G;
• player 0 has strategy set {0, 1};





ui(x) if x0 = 1
−er(i) if x0 = 0, xi 6= x̂i
er(i) if x0 = 0, xi = x̂i
where er(i) ∈ IRr(i) is the vector with each component equal to one.
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0 if x0 = 0
−1 if x0 = 1, x 6= x̂
1 if x0 = 1, x = x̂
Simple verification indicates that (1, x̂) is the unique Pareto equilibrium of H . Since φ(H) ⊆
PE(H), we conclude by r-NEM that (1, x̂) ∈ φ(H). Then by CONS, x̂ ∈ φ(HN
G,(1,x̂)) = φ(G),
since by definition HN
G,(1,x̂) = G. Hence x̂ ∈ φ(G), finishing our proof. 2
Our second result shows that the axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept on finite strate-
gic games of Peleg and Tijs (1996, Thm. 2.12) in terms of one person rationality, consistency
and converse consistency can also be generalized to multicriteria games.
Theorem 3.2 A solution concept φ on Γfinite satisfies OPE, CONS, and COCONS if and only
if φ = PE.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we have that φ ⊆ PE by OPE and CONS. To prove
that PE ⊆ φ, we use induction on the number of players. In one player games, the claim
follows from OPE. Now assume the claim holds for all finite multicriteria games with at most
n players and let G ∈ Γfinite be an (n + 1)-player game. By CONS: PE(G) ⊆ P̃E(G). By
induction: P̃E(G) ⊆ φ̃(G). By COCONS: φ̃(G) ⊆ φ(G). Combining these three inclusions:
PE(G) ⊆ φ(G). 2
These results seem to illustrate that the axiomatizations that exist in the literature for the Nash
equilibrium concept generalize in a straightforward manner to the Pareto equilibrium concept
in multicriteria games. This analogy, however, breaks down when we consider mixed extensions
of finite multicriteria games, as is done in the next section.
4 Mixed Extensions of Finite Multicriteria Games
Norde et al. (1996) characterize the Nash equilibrium concept on mixed extensions of finite
strategic form games by nonemptiness, one person optimality, and consistency. In this sec-
tion it is shown that analogons of these properties are not sufficient to characterize the Pareto
equilibrium concept in mixed extensions of finite multicriteria games.
First, we list some of the axioms used in this section. A solution concept φ on Γ satisfies:
• Nonemptiness (NEM), if φ(G) 6= ∅ for each G ∈ Γ;
• One Person Efficiency (OPE), if for each G ∈ Γ with |NG| = 1 we have that φ(G) =
{x ∈ ∆(Xi)| 6 ∃y ∈ ∆(Xi) : ui(y) > ui(x)}, the set of strategies that yield a maximal payoff
w.r.t. > on IRr(i);
• Consistency (CONS), if for each G ∈ Γ, each proper subcoalition S ⊂ NG, and each
element x ∈ φ(G), we have that xS ∈ φ(G
S,x);
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• Converse Consistency (COCONS), if for each G ∈ Γ with at least two players, we
have that φ̃(G) ⊆ φ(G), where




NG \ {∅, NG} : xS ∈ φ(G
S,x)}.
It is easy to see that PE on Γ satisfies NEM (See Lemma 2.2), OPE, and CONS. Moreover,
Lemma 4.1 If a solution concept φ on Γ satisfies OPE and CONS, then φ ⊆ PE.
Proof. Let φ be a solution concept on Γ, satisfying OPE and CONS. Let G ∈ Γ. If φ(G) = ∅,
we are done. So now let x ∈ φ(G). Then xi ∈ φ(G
i,x) by CONS, so xi ∈ {yi ∈ ∆(Xi)| 6 ∃zi ∈
∆(Xi) : ui(zi, x−i) > ui(yi, x−i)} by OPE. Hence x is a Pareto equilibrium: x ∈ PE(G). 2
Obviously, PE is the largest solution concept on Γ satisfying NEM, OPE, and CONS, but not
the only one, as our next result shows.
Proposition 4.2 There exists a solution concept φ on Γ which satisfies NEM, OPE, and CONS,
such that φ 6= PE.
Proof. Define φ as follows. Let G = 〈NG, (Xi)i∈NG, (ui)i∈NG〉 ∈ Γ.
• If |NG| = 1, take φ(G) = {x ∈ ∆(Xi)| 6 ∃y ∈ ∆(Xi) : ui(y) > ui(x)}, the nondominated
strategies as required in OPE.
• If |NG| > 1, take




G : 6 ∃yi ∈ ∆(Xi) such that ui(yi, x−i) ≥ ui(xi, x−i)},
where for a, b ∈ IRm we write a ≥ b if ai ≥ bi for all i = 1, . . . , m and a 6= b. Shapley (1959)
calls this the set of strong equilibrium points and provides an existence theorem similar to
Lemma 2.2, thereby establishing NEM.
It is easy to see that φ is also consistent. To show that φ 6= PE, consider the game G in
Figure 1, where the first player has two and the second player only one criterion. Obviously





In order to arrive at an axiomatization of PE, we require an additional axiom. A solution
concept φ on Γ satisfies:
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• WEIGHT if for every game G ∈ Γ and each vector (λi)i∈NG ∈
∏
i∈NG ∆r(i) of weights:
φ(Gλ) ⊆ φ(G).
In other words, φ satisfies WEIGHT if some of the solutions of a multicriteria game may be
found by weighing the criteria and computing the solution in the weighted strategic form game.
Our main result, using the strong theorems of Norde et al. (1996) and Shapley (1959), shows
that the Pareto equilibrium concept is the unique solution concept on Γ satisfying NEM, OPE,
CONS, and WEIGHT.
Theorem 4.3 A solution concept φ on Γ satisfies NEM, OPE, CONS, and WEIGHT if and
only if φ = PE.
Proof. Straightforward verification and application of Lemma 2.2 indicates that PE indeed
satisfies the four axioms. Now let φ be a solution concept on Γ satisfying NEM, OPE, CONS,
and WEIGHT. By Lemma 4.1, φ ⊆ PE. Now let G ∈ Γ, and x ∈ PE(G), which is possible by
NEM. Remains to show that x ∈ φ(G). By Lemma 2.2, there exists a vector λ = (λi)i∈NG ∈∏
i∈NG ∆r(i) of weights such that x ∈ NE(Gλ). Notice that φ restricted to Γstrategic, the set
of mixed extensions of strategic form games, satisfies NEM, OPR, and CONS, and hence by
Proposition 2.1, φ(H) = NE(H) for all H ∈ Γstrategic. Consequently, φ(Gλ) = NE(Gλ) 3 x.
So by WEIGHT: x ∈ φ(G). 2
Remark 4.4 The strong Pareto equilibrium concept, as mentioned in the proof of Proposition
4.2, can be axiomatized analogously by nonemptiness, consistency, one person strong efficiency,
and a weight axiom concerning strictly positive, rather than nonnegative, weights.
Finally, without proof, we mention that the analogon of Theorem 3.2 also holds when we consider
mixed extensions:
Theorem 4.5 A solution concept φ on Γ satisfies OPE, CONS, and COCONS if and only if
φ = PE.
It is an easy exercise to show that the axioms used in our theorems are logically independent.
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